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Abstract
The non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmen-
tal agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the
assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. By developing further a model of Bar-
rett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities
between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environ-
mental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA works far better than one self-enforcing
IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality
Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements, non-cooperative game the-
ory, stability, nonlinear optimization.
Working Paper, FNU 82.
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1 Introduction
The formation and implementation of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is the topic
of a broad economic literature. A significant part of the literature uses game theory as a tool
to understand the formation mechanism of IEAs. There are two main directions of literature
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on IEAs (for a review of current literature see Finus 2003; Carraro/Siniscalco 1998; Ioanni-
dis/Papandreou/Sartzetakis 2000; Carraro/Eyckmans/Finus 2005). The first direction utilizes
the concepts of cooperative game theory in order to model the formation of IEAs. This is a rather
optimistic view and it shows that an IEA signed by all countries is stable provided that utility is
transferable and side payments are adequate (Chander/Tulkens 1995, 1997). The second direction
uses the concepts of non-cooperative game theory to model the formation of IEAs. At the first
level, the link between the economic activity and physical environment is established in order to
generate the economical-ecological model. This link is established through a social welfare func-
tion. The social welfare function is represented as the difference between the profit from pollution
and the environmental damage. Following this approach, countries play a two stage-game. In the
first stage, each country decides to join or not the IEA. In the second stage, every country decides
on emissions. The emission game is solved first followed by equilibrium coalition. The main body
of literature examining the formation of IEA within a two stage framework uses a certain set of
assumptions. We mention below only the essential ones:
• Decisions are simultaneous in both stages.
• Countries are presented with single agreements.
• When defecting form coalition, a country assumes that all other countries remain in the
coalition (it is a consequence of employed stability concept of d’Aspremont et al (1983) that
allows only singleton movements and myopia).
• Within the coalition, players play cooperatively while the coalition and single countries com-
pete in a non cooperative way among them.
Non-cooperative game theory draws a pessimistic picture of the prospect of successful cooper-
ation between countries. It claims that a large coalition of signatories is hardly stable, and that
the free-rider incentive is strong. The model explains the problems of international cooperation in
the attendance of environmental spillovers, but cannot explain IEAs with high membership such
as the Montreal Protocol. This calls for a modification of the standard assumptions. We mention
in the following paragraphs some of the possible modifications.
Maybe the most important development is the work on coalition theory of Ray and Vohra (1994),
Yi and Shin (1995) Yi (1997) and Bloch (1995, 1996, 1997). They allow many coalitions to be
formed, although they employ different rule of forming coalitions. Ray and Vohra (1994) analyse
Equilibrium Binding Agreements, (a game in which coalitions can only break up into smaller coali-
tions) Bloch (1996) shows that the infinite-horizon Coalitional Unanimity game (game in which a
coalition is formed if and only if all members agree to form it) yields a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium coalitions structure. Yi and Shin (1995) examine an Open Membership Coalitional
game (in which nonmembers can join a coalition without the permission of existing members). Yi
(1997) shows that in the Open Membership Coalitional game the grand coalition can be an equi-
librium outcome for positive externalities. But for positive externalities in Coalitional Unanimity
game, the grand coalition will be rarely an equilibrium. He shows also that for the same game, the
grand coalition can rarely be an equilibrium outcome for negative externalities due to free-rider
problems.
A sequential choice of emission levels means there is a Stackelberg leader (a coalition of sig-
natories), who takes into account the optimal choice of non-signatories that behave as Stackelberg
followers (Barrett 1994a and 1997a). Participants have an advantage towards non-participants as
they chose they emissions level based on reaction function of non-participants.
Ecchia/Mariotti (1998) distinguish two problems in standard model of self-enforcing IEA. In
the basic model, countries are presumed to behave myopically by disregarding other countries’
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reaction when they make their choices. They modify this assumption by introducing the notion of
farsightedness. If countries are farsighted, that is they can foresee other countries’ reaction to their
choices and incorporate them into their decisions, a new notion of stability has to be established.
They demonstrate that if the idea of farsightedness is placed into the model, the likelihood of larger
coalition increases.
Within the framework of asymmetric welfare functions, transfers can help to increase member-
ship and success of IEAs (Botteon/Carraro 1997, Carraro/Siniscalco 1993 and Barrett 1997b).
Jeppesen/Andersen (1998) demonstrate that if some countries are committed to cooperation
concerning their abatement implies that this group of countries presuppose a leader role in forming
the coalition. The leading role allows them to evaluate potential aggregate benefits from increasing
the coalition and device side payments to countries that have follower role in order to attain
optimum membership.
Hoel/Schneider (1997) integrate a non-environmental cost function from not signing the IEA
which they call ”non-material payoff”. They find that, even in the absence of side payments the
number of signatories is not very small.
Barrett (1997b) uses a partial equilibrium model to observe the effectiveness of trade sanctions
in signing an IEA. He considers only trade goods that are linked to environmental problems. He
explains that if the public good agreement IEA is linked to a club agreement, such as a trade
agreement, the membership in IEAs can be raised. Issue linkage entails that countries can only
benefit from the club good agreement if they also become a member of an IEA. Botteon/Carraro
(1998), Carraro/Siniscalco (1997), Breton/Soubeyran (1998) and Katsoulacos (1997) give similar
conclusions.
Carraro/Marchiori/Oreffice (2001) make obvious that the implementation of a minimum par-
ticipation clause can help to improve the success of IEAs. Such a clause implies that a treaty only
enters into force if a certain number of signatories have approved it. The minimum participation
clauses in almost all IEAs in the past.
Endres (1996 and 1997) shows that the bargaining outcome under the inefficient uniform emis-
sion reduction quota regime may be better-quality from an ecological and economic point of view
than an efficient uniform tax rate in a two-country model. Endres/Finus (2002) Finus/Rundshagen
(1998b), Finus/Rundshagen (1998a) demonstrate that an inefficient emission reduction under the
quota regime is rewarded by higher stability and higher membership.
This paper uses non-cooperative game theory in order to develop further a model from Barrett
(1994a). Being aware of the recent work on coalition theory of Ray and Vohra (1994), Yi and
Shin (1995) and Bloch (1996, 1997) we think that modelling two self-enforcing IEA (employing
the stability concept of d’Aspremont et al. (1983)) can bring a better understanding of improving
capacity of IEA’s. We are less concerned with developing a general theory of coalition formation.
Rather, we present and apply a method for computing the maximum size of two coalition. The
loss in generality is compensated by a gain in practically. The main contribution of this paper
is the discussion on the possibility of improving capability (size and emission reduction) of two
self-enforcing IEA compared to one self-enforcing IEA by modelling the IEA as a one-shot game.
Another contribution is a different formulation (as nonlinear optimization problem) of finding α
(αN = the number of signatories) in extended Barrett’s model. Although our work is less general
than that of Yi and Shin, Bloch etc, we are able to compute the coalition sizes and optimal
abatement levels. We would like to stress that we reinforce the conclusions of Asheim et. al (2006)
and Carraro (2000) by following a different method, that is nonlinear optimization.
In section two we describe the Barrett’s model on one-self enforcing IEA and formulate it
differently as a nonlinear optimization problem. In the third section we present our model for
two-self enforcing IEA and introduce a essential part of our simulations. In section four we give
our conclusions and further suggestions. In the Appendix we present a full description of our
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simulation.
2 Barrett’s model
For an IEA to be self-enforcing means that no single nonsignatory has an incentive to join an
IEA (External Stability) and no single signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the agreements
(Internal Stability). Furthermore, the coalition has to be profitable, that is the coalition members
pay-off is greater than their pay-off in Nash equilibrium. The IEA have to be designed so that
they are self-enforcing because of nonexistence of a supranational authority that can implement
and enforce the agreements. The striking result of Barrett’s research is that a self-enforcing IEA
can be signed by large number of countries only when the difference between full cooperative and
noncooperative payoffs is small. When this difference is large, self-enforcing IEA would be signed
only by a small number of countries.
The model imposes some important assumptions which are:
• all countries are identical
• each country’s net benefit function is known and known to be known by all countries
• pollution abatement is the only policy instrument
• abatement levels are instantly and costlessly observable
• the pollutant does not accumulate in the environment
• cost functions are independent of one another
The abatement benefits function Bi(Q), the abatement cost function Ci(qi) and the profit
function pi of country i are defined as:
Bi(Q) = b(aQ−Q
2/2)/N (1)
Ci(qi) = cq
2
i /2 (2)
pii = Bi(Q)− Ci(qi) (3)
a ∈ R+,b ∈ R+ and c ∈ R+ parameters,
qi amount of abatement of country i,
Q global abatement Q =
∑N
i=1 qi,
N number of identical countries, each of them emits a pollutant.
The marginal abatement benefit and cost of country i are linear, b is the slope of marginal
benefit and c is the slope of marginal cost.
The full cooperative outcome is found by maximizing global net benefits Π =
∑N
i=1 pii with
respect to Q. The full cooperative abatement levels are:
Qc = aN/(N + γ) (4)
qc = a/(N + γ) (5)
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Qc global abatement, qc individual’s country abatement, γ = c/b.
Noncooperative outcome is found by maximizing country net benefits pi with respect to qi. The
noncooperative abatement levels are:
Q0 = a/(1 + γ) (6)
q0 = a/N(1 + γ) (7)
Q0 global abatement, q0 individual’s country abatement.
It is obvious that Qc > Q0.
2.1 One self-enforcing IEA
Let’s suppose we have αN countries that sign the IEA (signatories) forming a coalition and (1−α)N
countries that do not sign the agreements (nonsignatories). In the first stage the coalition of
signatories (Cs) try to maximize their net-benefits, the coalition behaves like Stackelberg leader
(Barrett 1994a and 1997a). In the second stage every nonsignatory try to maximize his own benefit
(after observing the behavior of signatories), they behave like Stackelberg followers. Modelling Cs
as a cooperative game, the Nash bargaining solution will require that each country undertake the
same level of abatement. This implies that if Qs is the total abatement of signatories and qs is the
single signatory abatement then Qs = αNqs. Let Qn be the total abatement of nonsignatories and
qn be the single nonsignatory abatement. As countries are identical the Nash equilibrium requires
that qn are identical thus Qn = (1− α)Nqn. The reaction function of nonsignatories is given by:
Qn(α,Qs) = (1− α)(a−Qs)/(γ + 1− α) (8)
In order to find Qs(α) the following nonlinear optimization problem need to be solved:
Max(Πs) s.t (8) (9)
where Πs the total benefit of signatories, pis a single benefit of a signatory, Πs =
∑
pis.
The solution is:
Q∗n(α) = aα
2Nγ/[(γ + 1− α)2 + α2Nγ] (10)
By substituting (10) to (8) it follows that:
Q∗s(α) = a(1− α)(γ + 1− α)/[(γ + 1− α)
2 + α2Nγ] (11)
Let’s define the self-enforcing (SE) IEA. We recall a concept developed for analysis of cartels
stability (d’Aspremont et al. 1983). Let’s assume we have αN signatories:
Definition 2.1 An IEA is self-enforcing if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
pis(α) ≥ pin(α− 1/N) and pin(α) ≥ pis(α+ 1/N).
[IEA is SE]⇐⇒ [pis(α) ≥ pin(α− 1/N) ∧ pin(α) ≥ pis(α+ 1/N)] (12)
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If (12) is satisfied, than no signatory wants to withdraw from the IEA. It will reduce costs, but
it will reduce benefits even more. This aspect of stability is known as Internal Stability. Similarly
no nonsignatory wants to join the IEA. It will rise benefits, but it will rise costs even more. This
aspect of stability is known as External Stability. For both cases any movement of any country
(joining or withdrawing from IEA) will reduce its profit.
Table 1: Analysis of one self-enforcing IEA for different α
α qs qn pis pin Q Π
0 - 8.6 - 725.5 85.7 7255.1
0.1 1.4 9.2 732.0 721.5 84.6 7225.8
0.2 3.3 9.7 729.2 718.9 83.9 7209.7
0.3 5.5 9.6 726.9 719.2 84.0 7214.8
0.4 7.8 9.0 725.6 723.2 85.0 7241.5
0.5∗ 9.7∗ 7.7∗ 725.8∗ 730.0∗ 87.1∗ 7279.1∗
0.6 10.9 6.2 727.4 737.4 89.7 7313.8
0.7 11.3 4.5 729.9 743.2 92.5 7338.7
0.8 11.1 3.1 732.7 746.9 94.9 7355.0
0.9 10.6 1.9 735.3 748.8 96.9 7366.9
1 9.8 - 737.7 - 98.4 7377.0
We introduce an example in order to make it clear. Let a = 100, b = 1.5, c = 0.25; and define
global net benefits (profits) Π(α) = αNpis + (1 − α)Npin. Table(1) shows the net benefit (profit)
and abatement levels for representative country i of signatories (Cs) as well as for representative
country i of nonsignatories (Cn) for each possible α. It also shows the global net benefits Π and
the global abatement level Q. Figure(1) gives a graphical relation between the profit of a single
country of signatories and nonsignatories and alpha. From Table(1) and Figure(1) it is clear that
the self-enforcing IEA conditions (12) are satisfied for α = 0.5.
The example explains how to find the number of countries that can form a self-enforcing IEA.
In other words, how to find α, then only αN countries can form a self-enforcing IEA. A very
simple algorithm (i = number of signatories) can be:
Table 2: A simple algorithm for finding α for one self-enforcing IEA
for i = 1 to N
if [pis(α) ≥ pin(α− 1/N) ∧ pin(α) ≥ pis(α+ 1/N)]
save α.
Please note that for our function’s specification we have only one α. We introduce a new for-
mulation of our problem. We formulate it as nonlinear optimization one, because this formulation
can be used to solve the problem of two self-enforcing IEA.
Max(α)
s.t [pis(α) ≥ pin(α− 1/N) ∧ pin(α) ≥ pis(α+ 1/N)] (13)
The problem van be formulated as minimization one1.
1αN usually will not be an integer number, but we round down, then find the new α = rounddown(αN)/N .
(Please note that if we solve our problem as maximization one and round down we get usually the same solution
if we solve it as minimization one and round up). Using Matlab Optimization Toolbox, minimization proved to be
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Figure 1: Stability analysis of IEA
3 Two self-enforcing IEA
In the case of two self-enforcing agreements we have two coalition of signatories; the first coalition
(Cs1) with α1N countries, and the second one (Cs2) with α2N countries, and (1 − α1 − α2)N
nonsignatories (Cn). Firstly the coalition of signatories (Cs1) (it is the Stackelberg leader
2) and
the second coalition of signatories (Cs2) (the Stackelberg follower for Cs1) are formed; they try to
maximize their net-benefits (every coalition knows the number of countries in the other coalition).
After observing the choice of signatories, every nonsignatory (Stackelberg followers for Cs1 and
Cs2) maximize its own net benefit by taking the abatement level of signatories coalition and
other nonsignatories as given. Let Qs1 be the total abatement of Cs1, qs1 be the single signatory
abatement of Cs1; let Qs2 be the total abatement of Cs2, qs2 be the single signatory abatement of
Cs2; let Qn be the total abatement of Cn, qn be the single signatory abatement of Cn. The same
arguments as before imply that Qs1 = α1qs1N , Qs2 = α2qs2N , Qn = (1− α1 − α2)qnN .
more robust. In our experience the starting point can be slightly problematic, but as we know that α ∈ [0, 1] it is
easily overcome.
2Note that this sequentially game can be easily changed by taking the Stackelberg leader Cs2. Or by taking both
of Cs1, Cs2 as Stackelbergs leaders playing between each-other a simultaneous Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
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Let’s summarize the notation that we use in this section:
α = α1 + α2,
Q = Qs +Qn,
Q total abatement level,
Qs total abatement level of two coalition of signatories,
Qn total abatement level of nonsignatories,
Qs = Qs1 +Qs2,
Qs1 total abatement level of first coalition,
Qs2 total abatement level of second coalition,
pis1 the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
Πs1 =
∑α1N
1 pii = α1Npis1 the total profit of first coalition of
signatories,
qs1 the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
pis2 the profit of a country of first coalition of signatories,
Πs2 =
∑α2N
1 pii = α2Npis2 the total profit of second coalition of
signatories,
qs2 the abatement level of a country of first coalition of signatories,
pin the profit of a country of nonsignatories,
qn the abatement level of a country of nonsignatories.
As we have the same cost and benefit function of country i, we have the same profit function,
which is given for the first and the second coalition of signatories and for nonsignatories by:
pis1 = b(aQ−Q
2/2)/N − cq2s1/2
pis2 = b(aQ−Q
2/2)/N − cq2s2/2
pin = b(aQ−Q
2/2)/N − cq2n/2
The reaction function of nonsignatories is similarly found by maximizing the profit of a single
nonsignatory pin:
Qn(α1, α2, Qs1, Qs2) = (1− α)(a−Qs)/(γ + 1− α) (14)
Note that above we have Qn = f(α1, α2, Qs1, Qs2), so the Qn is not independent variable
anymore. In order to find Qs2 = f(α1, α2, Qs1), we need to solve the following optimization
problem:
Max[Πs2 = b(aQ−Q
2/2)− cQ2s2/(2α2N)] s.t (14) (15)
Note that the above optimization problem can be transformed to a nonconstrained one by
replacing the equation (14) to objective function Πs2. As d
2Πs2/dQ
2
s2 < 0 then by dΠs2/dQs2 =
0⇒ Qs2 = f(α1, α2, Qs1). We do not write explicitly Qs2 = f(α1, α2, Qs1) because of the lengthy
analytical formula, but note that Qs2 is expressed by means of other variables. In order to find
Qs1 = f(α1, α2), we need to solve the similar optimization problem:
Max[Πs1 = b(aQ−Q
2/2)− cQ2s1/(2α1N)]
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s.t Qn(α1, α2, Qs1) = (1− α)(a−Qs)/(γ + 1− α), Qs2 = f(Qs1) (16)
Note that the above optimization problem can be transformed to a nonconstrained one by
replacing the constrains to objective function Πs1. As d
2Πs1/dQ
2
s1 < 0 then by dΠs1/dQs1 =
0 ⇒ Qs1 = f(α1, α2). As we have Qs1 = f(α1, α2), we replace it in Qs2 = f(Qs1) and have
Qs2 = f(α1, α2). We replace both of them in (14) then we get Qn = f(α1, α2). Finally we have
all pis2,Πs2, pis1,Πs1, pin,Πn as f(α1, α2).
In order to find α1 and α2 we need to formulate a different optimization problem. We need the
condition in (12) to be satisfied between three groups of countries, the coalition one of signatories,
(Cs1), the coalition two of signatories, (Cs2) and the nonsignatories, (Cn) in order to have inter-
coalition stability. The intercoalition stability means a stable relations between Cs2 and Cn,
Cs1 and Cs2 as well as Cs1 and Cs2.
Definition 3.1 We have intercoalition stability if and only if the following conditions (17),(18)
and (19) are satisfied:
[pis1(α1, α2) ≥ pin(α1 − 1/N, α2) ∧ pin(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1 + 1/N, α2)] (17)
[pis2(α1, α2) ≥ pin(α1, α2 − 1/N) ∧ pin(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1, α2 + 1/N)] (18)
[pis2(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1 + 1/N, α2 − 1/N) ∧ pis1(α1, α2) ≥ pis2(α1 − 1/N, α2 + 1/N)] (19)
It is important to note that the conditions (17),(18) and (19) together describe all possible
changes among Cs1,Cs2 and Cn if only one country is changing its position. It is clear that any
change in any country position reduce its profit. In other words they guarantee stability among two
coalitions and nonsignatories, so they guarantee intercoalition stability.
Now we are ready to formulate the nonlinear optimization problem that helps us to find α1
and α2.
Max(α1 + α2)
s.t
[pis1(α1, α2) ≥ pin(α1 − 1/N, α2) ∧ pin(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1 + 1/N, α2)]
[pis2(α1, α2) ≥ pin(α1, α2 − 1/N) ∧ pin(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1, α2 + 1/N)]
[pis2(α1, α2) ≥ pis1(α1 + 1/N, α2 − 1/N) ∧ pis1(α1, α2) ≥ pis2(α1 − 1/N, α2 + 1/N)]
The constrains of above optimization problem are just the conditions (17),(18) and (19). We
use the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox to solve the above optimization problem.
As one would expect the starting point and rounding are cumbersome 3.
3The starting point is slightly problematic but with the help of algorithm in Table (2) we can find a starting point
for α2. As the interval of α1 is small, it is not difficult to find the second starting point. As with the case of one
self-enforcing IEA, α1N and α2N will usually not be integer numbers, so we only can round both of them down and
find the new α1 = rounddown(α1N)/N and α2 = rounddown(α2N)/N . After rounding down we expect still the
six constrains to be satisfied (for one self-enforcing IEA there were only two constrains). Our numerical experience
advice us to solve the problem often as a minimization one in stead of maximization. (Please note that if we solve
our problem as a maximization one and round up we get usually the same solution if we solve it as a minimization
one and round down). We do this because the result of optimization α1N and α2N are not integer and rounding
them up works almost always better then rounding them down and it is almost always successful. In the case that
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Let introduce an example in order to make clear our proceeding. The values of parameters
are: a = 100, b = 1.5, c = 0.25, N = 10. The solution of our nonlinear optimization problem
is, α1 = 0.54, α2 = 0.22. After we round down, we have α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.2, note that after
rounding down our constrains (17), (18) and (19) are still satisfied. This can not happen always!
As qs1, qs2, qn, pis1, pis2, pin are function of only α1 and α2 we know all of them. As profit
functions depend on α1 and α2 we use also a 3-dimensional visualization. Note that we introduce
graphics for real nonnegative α, but the α’s that makes sense to our problem satisfy that αN is a
natural number.
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Figure 2: Graphical analysis of stability between first coalition and nonsignatories
In the Figure (2) we introduce graphically the relation between pis1, the profit of a country of
first coalition and pin, the profit of a single nonsignatory. In the plane α2 = 0.2 (the size of second
coalition is constant) parallel to YZ-plane, we see the pis1, pin only as function of α1. In the Figures
(3) we see the plane α2 = 0.2 only in 2 dimension. Note that any movement of a country of Cs1
to Cn or in the opposite direction reduces the profit of country that moves.
The Figures (4) and (5) are similar to Figures (2) and (3) but we introduce graphically the
relation between pis2, the profit of a country of first coalition and pin, the profit of a single nonsigna-
rounding up does not give a solution, we follow another way. In the first step we solve four nonlinear optimization
problem that have the same constrains as above, but the objective function is different. The four different objective
functions are Min(α1), Min(α2) and Max(α1), Max(α2). As we solve the maximization problem we know the
intervals, which α1 and α2 that satisfy the conditions (17),(18) and (19), belong. The α1 ∈ [αmin1 , α
max
1
] and
α2 ∈ [αmin2 , α
max
2
]. The minimal values αmin
1
, αmin
2
come from solving the nonlinear minimization problems and
the maximization values αmax
1
, αmax
2
from solving the nonlinear maximization problems. As we know this intervals,
(which usually are small) a relatively simple combinatorial work to find all possible (α1),(α2) for which α1N and
α2N are integer. If none of them satisfies the conditions (17),(18) and (19) then we can say there is no local solution
to our problem !
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Figure 3: Graphical analysis of stability between first coalition and nonsignatories
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Figure 4: Graphical analysis of stability between second coalition and nonsignatories
tory. The graphical relation is clear in the plane α2 = 0.5 (the size of first coalition is constant)
parallel to XZ-plane.
In the Figure (6) we present graphically the relation between pis1, the profit of a country of
first coalition and pis2, the profit of a country of second coalition. In the plane α1 + α2 = 0.7
(the number of nonsignatories is constant) parallel to Z-axes, we see the pis1, pis2 as function of
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Figure 5: Graphical analysis of stability between second coalition and nonsignatories
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Figure 6: Graphical analysis of stability between first and second coalition
α1 and α2. We must chose the plane α1 + α2 = 0.7 because in this plane is located our solution
α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.2. In the Figure (7) we see the plane α1 + α2 = 0.7 in 2 dimension. In the
upper part of Figure (7) we put the values of α2 too. Note that as before any movement of single
signatory of Cs1 to Cs2 or in the opposite direction reduces the profit of country that moves.
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3.1 Simulations
We present in this section the essential part of our simulations and we postpone the detailed
description of them in Appendix. Firstly let’s define:
the global profit, no coalition Πα=0 = Npin = Πn.
the global profit, grand coalition Πα=1 = Npis = Πs.
the global profit, one coalition Πα1 = α1Npis1 + (1− α1)Npin = Πs1 +Πn.
the global profit, two coalitions
Π(α1,α2) = α1Npis1 + α2Npis2 + (1− α1 − α2)Npin = Πs1 +Πs2 +Πn.
the global abatement, no coalition Qα=0 = Nqn = Qn.
the global abatement, grand coalition Qα=1 = Nqs = Qs.
the global abatement, one coalition Qα1 = α1Nqs1 + (1− α1)Nqn = Qs1 +Qn.
the global abatement, two coalitions
Q(α1,α2) = α1Nqs1 + α2Nqs2 + (1− α1 − α2)Nqn = Qs1 +Qs2 +Qn.
the fraction of fully cooperative welfare
for one coalition:
(Πα1 −Πα=0)/(Πα=1 −Πα=0).
for two coalitions:
(Π(α1,α2) −Πα=0)/(Πα=1 −Πα=0).
the fraction of fully cooperative abatement
for one coalition:
(Qα1 −Qα=0)/(Qα=1 −Qα=0).
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for two coalitions:
(Q(α1,α2) −Qα=0)/(Qα=1 −Qα=0).
the fraction of countries in one coalition α1.
the fraction of countries in two coalitions (α1 + α2).
The Figures (8), (9), and (10) use the data from Tables (3), (10) in Appendix. The set of
parameters are: a = 100, N = 10 and we vary γ = c/b. It is clear from that the fraction of fully
cooperative welfare, the fraction of fully cooperative abatement and the fraction of countries in two
coalition increase if we increase γ = c/b for two self-enforcing agreements (two coalition) compared
to one self-enforcing agreements (one coalition). When γ is small, one coalition is better than two
coalitions.
The Figures (11), (12), and (13) use the data form Tables (7) and (8) in Appendix. The set
of parameters are: a = 100, c = 0.25, b = 1.5 so γ = c/b = 0.167 ; a = 100, c = 0.3, b = 1.5,
γ = c/b = 0.833; a = 100, c = 150, b = 25, γ = c/b = 6 and we vary N (total number of countries).
From the figures we derive the conclusion that if the damage cost is relative big (γ large), and
if the number of countries is small then two coalitions improve the welfare and abatement level
significantly compared to one coalition. In all cases a higher N implies less additional welfare and
abatement due to the second coalition. So, a second coalition is more effective with a small number
of countries than with a large number.
4 Conclusions
The paper investigates the size and the improving capability of two self-enforcing IEA. An IEA is
self-enforcing when no country wants to withdraw and no country wants to join the IEA. As we
employ a simplified model the results must be interpreted with caution. Although our work is less
general than that of Yi and Shin, Bloch etc, we are able to compute the coalition sizes and optimal
abatement levels.
The paper shows the results of Barrett on one self-enforcing IEA are partly true for two self-
enforcing international IEAs too; when the coalitions of signatories are big, the difference (in
welfare and environmental quality) between the two self-enforcing IEA and one self-enforcing IEA
(as well as noncooperative behavior) is small, two self-enforcing IEA can even reduce the welfare
and environment quality; only when the coalitions of signatories are small, the two self-enforcing
IEA can bring improvements compared to the case of one self-enforcing IEA.
A striking result is that when the cost of pollution abatement is high and the total number of
countries is small, then two self-enforcing IEA can significantly improve welfare and environmental
equality compared to one-self enforcing IEA. So the model shows that in continental pollution
problems where the above conditions are met, two self-enforcing IEA’s can be preferred to a single
coalition.
As always further research is needed in asymmetry between countries, independence cost func-
tion, issue linkage, repeated games, uncertainty or limited information.
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Figure 8: Profit Π as function of γ ( = c/b) for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Figure 9: Abatement Q as function of γ ( = c/b) for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Figure 10: Coalition size as function of γ ( = c/b) for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Figure 11: Profit Π as function of N and γ for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Figure 12: Abatement Q as function of N and γ for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Figure 13: Coalition size as function of N and γ for one and two self-enforcing IEA.
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Appendix
We present below a detailed description of our simulation.
Table (3) gives the total profit (Π) and global abatement level (Q) for noncooperative behavior
(α = 0) and cooperative behavior (α = 1). Cooperation brings higher welfare and lower emissions.
Table (3) also shows the net benefit and the abatement level of a representative country of
signatories coalition (Cs) as well as of a representative country of nonsignatories (Cn) when α is
maximized in the case of one self-enforcing IEA. It shows the global net benefits Π and the global
abatement level Q. As in Barrett(1994a) the coalition is larger if stakes are lower.
Insert Table 3 here.
Table (3) also shows the net benefit and the abatement level of a representative country of
signatories coalition (Cs1, Cs2) as well as of a representative country of nonsignatories (Cn) when
the sum (α1 + α2) is maximized in the case of two self-enforcing IEA. It shows the global net
benefits Π and the global abatement level Q too.
We keep a = 100, c = 0.25, N = 10 unchanged and vary b > c (for b < c see Table (4)).
In the first part of the Table (3) (b is big compared to c, γ = c/b is small and the coalitions are
big). An abatement increase by the coalition Cs2 is offset by abatement decrease by the coalition
Cs1 while the nonsignatories Cn play almost the same role in one and two self-enforcing IEA’s.
Total abatement goes down by having two coalitions. Total welfare also falls. Note that single
coalition is stable to the deviations of individual countries but not against deviations of a group of
countries.
In the second part of Table (3) (b = 0.5, b is smaller compared to c, γ = c/b is small, the
coalitions are still big) the coalition of signatories Cs2 has the same benefits as the nonsignatories
Cn, so we have no change on the environment quality and welfare if compared to one self-enforcing
IEA.
In the third part of Table (3) (when b = 0.3, γ = c/b is almost 1, the coalitions are small) a
second international IEA is benificial. The coalition of signatories Cs1 brings more benefits to the
environment than the nonsignatories Cn by increasing the total abatement Q (by 1.2 per cent)
and also improving the welfare compared to one self-enforcing IEA. But even for this example the
increase in the abatement levels of Cs1 is partly offset by the decrease in the abatement levels of
Cs2, while the nonsignatories Cn play the same role in one and two self-enforcing IEA.
In Table (4) we introduce the similar results as in Table (3) for different values of parameters
b, c. We keep a = 100, N = 10, b = 0.25 unchanged and chose c > b. In the first part of Table (4)
c = 1.5, in the second part c = 1.
As we see in the first part of the Table (4) (c = 1.5, c is relatively big compared to b, γ = c/b
is big, the coalitions are small) but the second self-enforcing IEA brings significant improvement
compared to one self-enforcing IEA. This is due to the fact that the abatement levels of coalition
of signatories Cs2 are much higher than the abatement level of coalition of signatories Cs1 and
nonsignatories Cn.
Insert Table 4 here.
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In spite of the fact that abatement increase by the coalition Cs2 is partly offset by abatement
decrease by the nonsignatories Cn and the coalition of signatories Cs1 we have still the improvement
of Q by 34.2 per cent and total profit Π by 26.1 per cent. For c = 1 results are similar.
The difference of Q and Π between the two self-enforcing IEA and noncooperative behavior is
big in both parts of Table (4).
Sensitivity analysis
The difference between the first and the second part of Table (5) is that we keep b = 1.5, c =
0.25, N = 10 unchanged but we change a 10 times bigger, from a = 100 to a = 1000.
Insert Table 5 here.
As we see the total profit Π is 100 times bigger (also individual profit pi), the total abatement
level Q is 10 times bigger (also individual abatement level q ), but the size of signatories coalition
remains constant.
The same analysis apply for the difference between noncooperative and cooperative behavior
when a goes 100 to 1000. This is clearly concluded from the analytical formula for noncooperative
and cooperative behavior.
In Table (6) we introduce the similar results as in Table (3) and Table (4) but choosing b, c
much bigger than before (from 10 to 100 times bigger).
In the first part of Table (6) we rewrite result of the last part of Table (3) and in the second
part of it we keep a = 100, N = 10 unchanged, but we change b, c 100 times bigger (from b = 0.3
to b = 30, from c = 0.25 to c = 25). As we see the first and second are qualitatively the same. In
both parts two self-enforcing IEA brings a little improvement in environmental quality and welfare
compared one self-enforcing IEA. The value of Q (and individual q) remains the same, but no
surprise that the total profit Π (and individual pi too) is 100 times bigger. The size of signatories
coalition and nonsignatories remains constant.
In the third part of Table (6) we keep a = 100, N = 10 unchanged, but we change b around 17
times and c 10 times (from b = 17.5 to b = 300, from c = 10 to c = 300).
Insert Table 6 here.
As we see the third and forth part of Table (6) are still qualitatively similar. In both parts
the second self-enforcing IEA brings a little improvement in environmental quality and welfare
compared one self-enforcing IEA but in stead of a significant carbon-leakage phenomena we have
only a smaller carbon-leakage phenomena. But here we have the value of Q (and individual q too)
is around 1.3 times smaller, but the total profit Π (and individual pi too) is around 15 times bigger.
The size of signatories coalition is a little smaller.
The difference between the fifth and sixth part of Table (6) is that we increase b, c by 100 times
(from b = 0.25 to b = 25, from c = 1.5 to c = 150). We keep a = 100 and N = 10 unchanged.
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The difference in the results are identically the same as for the first part of Table (6) so we do not
repeat the previous analysis.
The difference between the first part and the second part of Table (7) is that we keep a =
100, b = 1.5, c = 0.25 unchanged but we change N form 10 to 20. We have an improvement of
welfare by 0.5 per cent but a little decrease of environmental quality. The individual abatement
levels and profit are decreased by factor 2.
Insert Table 7 here.
The number of first coalition of signatories is two times bigger, while the second signatories
coalition Cs2 has one country more. In the first part of Table (7) the two self-enforcing IEA’s
benefit environment, but worsening the welfare while in the second part the two self-enforcing
IEA’s is working identically the same as one self-enforcing IEA. By increasing N the difference
between one and two self-enforcing IEA decreases.
The difference between the third part and the fourth part of Table (7) is that we keep a =
100, b = 0.3, c = 0.25 unchanged but we change N from 10 to 20. We have a small decrease of
welfare and a little decrease of environmental quality. Individual abatement levels and profit are
lower by factor 2. The number of first and the second coalition signatories are the same. In the
third part of Table (7) the two self-enforcing IEA is working better than one self-enforcing IEA.
In the fourth part, the difference between one and two IEA’s is larger than in the third part.
The difference of Q and Π between the two self-enforcing IEA and noncooperative behavior is
smaller when N is bigger. By increasing N , the Q and Π for noncooperative behavior get bigger.
We introduce Table (8) in order to see that the significant improvement in environment equality
and welfare that we see in Table (4) are significantly reduced when we have a much bigger N . The
difference between the first part, the second and the third part of Table (8) is that we keep
a = 100, b = 25, c = 150 unchanged but we change N form 10 to 20 and then to 100.
Insert Table 8 here.
As we can see the second s.e IEA brings significantly more improvement on environment equality
and welfare (Q is improved by more than 34 per cent and Π by more than 26 per cent) when
N = 10 (first part of Table (8)). When N = 20 (second part of Table (8)) we have relatively less
improvement on environment equality and welfare (Q is improved by more than 18 per cent and
Π by more than 15 per cent), compared with the case when N = 10. When N = 100 (third part
of Table (8)) we have significantly less improvement on environment equality and welfare (Q is
improved only by 1.14 per cent and Π only by 1.06 per cent), compared with the case when N = 10.
When we change N we have the other changes we have already mentioned in the discussion of Table
(7)).
Summary
When γ is small we have big coalitions of signatories but the second self-enforcing IEA worsens
the environment quality and welfare compared to one self-enforcing IEA. When γ gets bigger, there
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comes a point where the second self-enforcing IEA works the same as one self-enforcing IEA but
we have smaller coalitions of signatories. When γ ≈ 1 the second self-enforcing IEA brings a little
improvement in environment quality and welfare compared to one self-enforcing IEA in spite of the
fact that the coalitions of signatories are even smaller. Only when γ is big and N is not so big the
second self-enforcing IEA brings significant improvement in environment and welfare compared one
self-enforcing IEA, but the increase of N reduced drastically the improvement. Having a bigger N
(when γ is small) increases environmental quality but reduces welfare. A bigger N (when γ ≈ 1)
worsens a little the environment and the welfare. The individual q andpi, of both signatories and
nonsignatories, decrease by the same amount (relatively) as N increases. A bigger a means better
environmental equality and welfare. A bigger b and c means always a better welfare; if b > c we
have a little decrease in environmental equality; if b ≤ c we have a constant level of environmental
equality.
The values of parameters for which two self-enforcing IEA brings a significant improvement
compared to one self-enforcing IEA are: a big a, b and c (they guarantee good environmental
quality and welfare level) and b ≤ c as well as a relatively small N (they guarantee two self-
enforcing IEA brings a big improvement compared to one self-enforcing IEA).
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Table 3: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
different b. (The symbol * we use to mark stability abatement values, and it is valid for all tables).
a second s.e IEA reduces welfare, increases abatement
a b c N
100 1.5 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 8.57 - - 725.51 85.7 7255.1
1 - 9.84 - - 737.7 - - 98.4 7377.0
0.5∗ - 9.7∗ - 7.7∗ 725.8∗ - 730.0∗ 87.09∗ 7279.1∗
0.5∗ 0.2∗ 10.6∗ 5.5∗ 7.7∗ 723.6∗ 733.7∗ 730.1∗ 87.11∗ 7275.5∗
a second s.e IEA reduces welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 1 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 8 - - 472 80 4720
1 - 9.76 - - 487.8 - - 97.6 4878.0
0.4∗ - 8.9∗ - 7.6∗ 472.2∗ - 474.9∗ 81.1∗ 4738.1∗
0.4∗ 0.2∗ 9.6∗ 5.9∗ 7.7∗ 470.1∗ 477.2∗ 474.2∗ 80.79∗ 4731.6∗
a second s.e IEA leaves things unchanged
a b c N
100 0.5 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 6.67 - - 216.67 66.7 2166.7
1 - 9.52 - - 238.1 - - 95.2 2381.0
0.3∗ - 7.9∗ - 6.3∗ 216.9∗ - 219.8∗ 68.3∗ 2189.2∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 7.9∗ 6.3∗ 6.3∗ 216.9∗ 219.8∗ 219.8∗ 68.3∗ 2189.2∗
a second s.e IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.3 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 5.45 - - 115.29 54.5 1152.9
1 - 9.23 - - 138.46 - - 92.3 1384.6
0.3∗ - 8.1∗ - 4.9∗ 116.4∗ - 121.5∗ 58.8∗ 1199.6∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 7.7∗ 6.1∗ 4.9∗ 118.0∗ 120.8∗ 122.4∗ 59.5∗ 1207.7∗
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Table 4: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
different c.
a second s.e IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.25 1.5 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.2∗ - 2.5∗ - 1.4∗ 32.5∗ - 35.6∗ 16.1∗ 349.6∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 39.4∗ 43.9∗ 46.9∗ 21.6∗ 440.7∗
a second s.e IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.25 1 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 2 - - 43 20 430
1 - 7.14 - - 89.29 - - 71.4 892.9
0.2∗ - 3.2∗ - 1.9∗ 43.8∗ - 47.2∗ 22.1∗ 465.3∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 4.4∗ 3.2∗ 1.8∗ 51.4∗ 56.1∗ 59.6∗ 28.5∗ 564.2∗
Table 5: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
different a.
a second IEA reduces welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 1.5 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 8.57 - - 725.51 85.7 7255.1
1 - 9.84 - - 737.7 - - 98.4 7377.0
0.5∗ - 9.7∗ - 7.7∗ 725.8∗ - 730.0∗ 87.09∗ 7279.1∗
0.5∗ 0.2∗ 10.6∗ 5.5∗ 7.7∗ 723.6∗ 733.7∗ 730.1∗ 87.11∗ 7275.5∗
a b c N
1000 1.5 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 85.71 - - 72551.02 857.1 725510.2
1 - 98.36 - - 73770.49 - - 983.6 737704.9
0.5∗ - 96.7∗ - 77.4∗ 72580.6∗ - 73002.1∗ 870.9∗ 727913.6∗
0.5∗ 0.2∗ 105.7∗ 55.2∗ 77.3∗ 72356.7∗ 73372.7∗ 73006.5∗ 871.1∗ 727549.1∗
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Table 6: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
big b and c.
a second IEA improves welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.3 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 5.45 - - 115.29 54.5 1152.9
1 - 9.23 - - 138.46 - - 92.3 1384.6
0.3∗ - 8.1∗ - 4.9∗ 116.4∗ - 121.5∗ 58.8∗ 1199.6∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 7.7∗ 6.1∗ 4.9∗ 118.0∗ 120.8∗ 122.4∗ 59.5∗ 1207.7∗
a b c N
100 30 25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.3∗ - 8.1∗ - 4.9∗ 11640.0∗ - 12147.8∗ 58.8∗ 119957.3∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 7.7∗ 6.1∗ 4.9∗ 11801.7∗ 12076.6∗ 12242.8∗ 59.4∗ 120772.3∗
a second IEA improves welfare and abatement
a b c N
1000 17.5 10 100
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.03∗ - 7.1∗ - 6.4∗ 75729.8∗ - 75777.5∗ 637.1∗ 7577608.6∗
0.04∗ 0.03∗ 9.3∗ 7.2∗ 6.3∗ 75837.0∗ 76016.1∗ 76075.8∗ 641.8∗ 7606444.3∗
a b c N
1000 300 300 100
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.03∗ - 7.6∗ - 5.0∗ 1122251.9∗ - 1127121.6∗ 503.9∗ 112697554.3∗
0.03∗ 0.02∗ 7.4∗ 7.6∗ 4.9∗ 1128322.1∗ 1127920.9∗ 1132976.9∗ 507.8∗ 113268553.0∗
a second IEA improves welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.25 1.5 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.2∗ - 2.5∗ - 1.4∗ 32.5∗ - 35.6∗ 16.1∗ 349.6∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 39.4∗ 43.9∗ 46.9∗ 21.6∗ 440.7∗
a b c N
100 25 150 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0.2∗ - 2.5∗ - 1.4∗ 3248.4∗ - 3558.3∗ 16.1∗ 34962.8∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 3942.6∗ 4385.2∗ 4693.4∗ 21.6∗ 44065.4∗
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Table 7: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between one and two self-enforcing IEA for
different N.
a second IEA reduces welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 1.5 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 8.57 - - 725.51 85.7 7255.1
1 - 9.84 - - 737.7 - - 98.4 7377.0
0.5∗ - 9.7∗ - 7.7∗ 725.8∗ - 730.0∗ 87.09∗ 7279.1∗
0.5∗ 0.2∗ 10.6∗ 5.5∗ 7.7∗ 723.6∗ 733.7∗ 730.1∗ 87.11∗ 7275.5∗
a b c N
100 1.5 0.25 20
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 8.57 - - 730.1 85.7 7301.0
1 - 9.92 - - - - 743.8 99.2 7438.0
0.3∗ - 4.76∗ - 4.12∗ 365.09∗ - 365.79∗ 86.26∗ 7311.65∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 4.76∗ 4.12∗ 4.12∗ 365.09∗ 365.79∗ 365.79∗ 86.26∗ 7311.65∗
a second IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 0.3 0.25 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 5.45 - - 115.29 54.5 1152.9
1 - 9.23 - - 138.46 - - 92.3 1384.6
0.3∗ - 8.1∗ - 4.9∗ 116.4∗ - 121.5∗ 58.8∗ 1199.6∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 7.7∗ 6.1∗ 4.9∗ 118.0∗ 120.8∗ 122.4∗ 59.5∗ 1207.7∗
a b c N
100 0.3 0.25 20
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 5.45 - - 117.15 54.5 1171.5
1 - 9.6 - - 144 - - 96.0 1440
0.15∗ - 3.90∗ - 2.62∗ 58.8∗ - 59.8∗ 56.3∗ 1193.0∗
0.15∗ 0.1∗ 3.87∗ 2.75∗ 2.62∗ 58.9∗ 59.8∗ 59.9∗ 56.4∗ 1194.3∗
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Table 8: Comparing the abatement levels and benefits between a successful two self-enforcing IEA
for different N.
a second IEA increases welfare and abatement
a b c N
100 25 150 10
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 1.43 - - 3163.3 14.3 31632.7
1 - 6.25 - - 7812.5 - - 62.5 78125
0.2∗ - 2.5∗ - 1.4∗ 3248.4∗ - 3558.3∗ 16.1∗ 34962.8∗
0.3∗ 0.2∗ 3.4∗ 2.4∗ 1.3∗ 3942.6∗ 4385.2 4693.4∗ 21.6∗ 44065.4∗
a b c N
100 25 150 20
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 0.71 - - 1619.9 14.3 32398
1 - 3.85 - - 4807.7 - - 76.9 96153.9
0.1∗ - 1.2∗ - 0.7∗ 1716.1∗ - 1518.1∗ 15.2∗ 34171.3∗
0.15∗ 0.1∗ 1.8∗ 1.2∗ 0.7∗ 1811.6∗ 1937.3∗ 2013.0∗ 18.0∗ 39504.3∗
a b c N
100 25 150 100
α1 α2 qs1 qs2 qn pis1 pis2 pin Q Π
0 - - - 0.14 - - 330.1 14.3 33010.2
1 - 0.94 - - 1179.2 - - 94.3 117924.5
0.03∗ - 0.37∗ - 0.14∗ 333.9∗ - 342.5∗ 14.86 34219.7∗
0.03∗ 0.02∗ 0.36∗ 0.24∗ 0.14∗ 337.7∗ 343.2∗ 346.1∗ 15.03∗ 34583.0∗
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